Estate Argues Charitable Deduction for CRAT Improperly Denied
In a reply brief for the Eleventh Circuit, an estate has argued that it is
entitled to a charitable deduction for property passing to a trust intended to
qualify as a charitable remainder annuity trust even though the required annual
distributions weren't made.
Document Type: Taxpayer Briefs
Tax Analysts Document Number: Doc 2002-11314 (42 original pages)
Tax Analysts Electronic Citation: 2002 TNT 98-48
Citations: Estate of Melvine B. Atkinson, et al. v. Commissioner; No.
01-16536-FF (
=============== CASE NAME ===============
ESTATE OF MELVINE B. ATKINSON, DECEASED,
CHRISTOPHER J. MACQUARRIE, EXECUTOR,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent-Appellee.
=============== SUMMARY ===============
In a reply brief for the Eleventh Circuit, an estate has argued that it is
entitled to a charitable deduction for property passing to a trust intended to
qualify as a charitable remainder annuity trust (CRAT) even though the required
annual distributions weren't made.
In 1991, Melvine B. Atkinson put stock worth $3,999,974 in a trust entitled
the Melvine B. Atkinson Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust (the trust).
Atkinson died on
On Atkinson's death, the trust was to pay the annuity to a number of
individuals if they each furnished their share of the funds for payment of
federal estate and state death taxes for which the trustee was liable on
Atkinson's death. Only one beneficiary, Mary Birchfield, elected to receive the
annuity. She informed the trustee she was not liable for her share of the tax
and claimed to have a notarized letter from Atkinson so stating. The trustee
decided it was in the trust's best interest to settle Mary's claim and received
an order from a probate judge permitting payment of the taxes from the trust. The
annuity payments already due Mary that had been set aside were paid to Mary in
1996 and four additional payments were made to her before her death. She did
not pay any estate or state death taxes on the amounts received. Later, it was
determined that the estate had insufficient funds to pay both the estate taxes
on Mary's portion and the administration expenses of the decedent. Thus, it
would be necessary to invade the CRAT to make up the shortfall.
Mary died in 1997 of breast cancer. At the time of the estate valuation, the
trustee had an affidavit from Mary's doctor that she had a less than 5-year
life expectancy. However, the estate based the value of her annuity on a normal
life expectancy.
On audit, the IRS determined that the annuity trust was not a valid CRAT and
that no charitable deduction was available to the estate. The IRS claimed that
the trust did not function as a CRAT because it failed to make the required
payments to Atkinson and the settlement with Mary would permit trust principal
beyond the annuity amount to be paid for noncharitable purposes. The trustee
argued that not only was the estate eligible for the deduction but it was
eligible for a bigger deduction than taken because the valuation should have
taken into account Mary's shortened life span.
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS and held that the trust did not function
as a CRAT and thus no charitable estate tax deduction was available to the
estate. Noting that the terms of the trust met the statutory requirements for
distributions, the court found that the trust did not operate in accordance
with its own terms. (For a summary, see Tax Notes, Jul. 31, 2000, p. 643; for
the full text, see Doc 2000-20159 (16 original pages) or 2000 TNT 145-10 
.)
The estate argues that the Tax Court erred by skipping over section 2055(a)
and other authorities that all indicate that section 2055(a) and not section
2055(e)(2) controls in this case. The estate insists that the Tax Court's
decision creates unnecessary dangers in the practical handling of charitable
bequests. The estate also emphasizes that the settlement with Mrs. Birchfield
cannot create a split interest for purposes of section 2055(e)(2) and should be
considered a deductible claim, consistent with sound trust administration.
=============== FULL TEXT ===============
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
ON APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF
THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT
REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
DAVID D. AUGHTRY
CHARLES E. HODGES II
CHAMBERLAIN, HRDLICKA, WHITE,
WILLIAMS & MARTIN
191 Peachtree Strect, NE, Ninth
Floor
(404) 659-1410
JOSEPH W. HATCHETT
AKERMAN,
(850) 222-3471
ATTORNEYS FOR
APPELLANT
Estate of Melvine B. Atkinson (11th Cir. - No. 01-16536-FF)
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
[1] Pursuant to Local Rule 26.1-1 of this Court, it is hereby certified that
the following persons have an interest in the outcome of this case or have
participated as attorneys or as judges in the adjudication of this case.
Melvine B. Atkinson (Deceased), Estate of, Petitioner-Appellant
David D. Aughtry, Counsel for Petitioner-Appellant
Kevin M. Brown, Division Counsel, Internal Revenue
Service
Stuart L. Brown, Former Chief Counsel, Internal
Revenue Service
Jonathan S. Cohen, Special Litigation Counsel,
Appellate Section, Tax Division, United States Department of Justice
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Respondent-Appellee
Benjamin A. de Luna, District Counsel, Internal
Revenue Service
Jeff P. Erlich, Internal Revenue Service
Craig A. Etter (Greenberg Traurig), Attorney for
Petitioner in Tax Court
Claire Fallon, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Tax Division, United States Department of Justice
Willie Fortenberry, Jr., Former Acting Assistant
District Counsel, Internal Revenue Service
The Honorable Joel Gerber, United States Tax Court
Judge
William A. Goss, Regional Counsel, Internal Revenue
Service
Danielle Grim, Attorney, Internal Revenue Service
Joseph W. Hatchett, Counsel for
Petitioner-Appellant
Charles E. Hodges II, Counsel for
Petitioner-Appellant
Timothy Jessell, (Greenberg Traurig), Attorney for
Petitioner in Tax Court
Christopher J. MacQuarrie, Personal Representative
for Petitioner-Appellant
Stewart A. Marshall, III, Counsel for
Petitioner-Appellant
J. Michael Melvin, Associate Area Counsel, Internal
Revenue Service
Francis C. Mucciolo, Trial Attorney, District
Counsel, Internal Revenue Service
Eileen J. O'Connor, Assistant Attorney General, Tax
Division, United States Department of Justice
Steven W. Parks, Counsel for Respondent-Appellee
Michael A. Pesavento, Acting Assistant District
Counsel, Internal Revenue Service
Hurley
Anthony T. Sheehan, Counsel for Respondent-Appellee
Richard W. Skillman, Former Acting Chief Counsel,
Internal Revenue Service
STATEMENT
REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
[2] Oral argument has been set for the week of
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE
[3] Pursuant to FED.R.APP. P. 32(a)(5)(A), it is hereby certified that this
Brief filed by Appellant is presented in 14 point Times New Roman type.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
CERTIFICATE OF TYPE SIZE AND STYLE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Section 2055(a) -- Not (e)(2) -- and the Authority of this and Other
Circuits Control
2. By Ignoring These Authorities, the Tax Court
Opinion and the Commissioner Create Unnecessary Dangers for Every Trust Officer
in Every Bank, Every Elderly Citizen with Charitable Intentions, and Every
Charitable Trust That Can Be Targeted by Unscrupulous Claimants
3. Mrs. Atkinson's Life Estate Was Properly
Handled, But That Life Estate Is Statutorily Irrelevant for Estate Tax
Charitable Deduction Purposes
4. The Settlement of Mrs. Birchfield's Claims Does
Not Defeat the Recognition of the
5. The Charitable Trust is Not Liable For Taxes
and, Even If It Were, the Charitable Deduction is Protected by Congress in
Section 2055(c)
ARGUMENT
A. THE COMMISSIONER, LIKE THE TAX COURT, STARTS OUT ON THE WRONG FOOT BY
SKIPPING OVER SECTION 2055(a), CITIZENS, OETTING, BANK OF
1. The Commissioner Assumes that Section 2055(e)(2) -- Not 2055(a) --
Necessarily Applies Without Addressing Its Five Threshold Hurdles
2. Mrs. Atkinson's Life Estate Is Irrelevant under
Section 2055(e)(2), Since Her Interest Was "Extinguished upon the
Decedent's Death
B. THE CONCLUSION URGED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND THE TAX COURT CREATES,
UNNECESSARY DANGERS IN THE PRACTICAL HANDLING OF CHARITABLE BEQUESTS
C. THE SETTLEMENT WITH MRS. BIRCFIFIELD CANNOT
CREATE A
1. Under the Authority of Every Court to Consider the Issue, the Post-Mortem
Settlement Cannot Create a Split- Interest for Purposes of Section 2055(e)(2)
2. The Trustee, the Trust's Counsel, and the
Probate Court Agreed that the Birchfield Settlement Payments Were Adequate and
Full Consideration for Release of her Claims
3. The Commissioner Does Not Challenge the
Deductibility of the Claim Under Section 2053
4. Even If Section 2055(e)(2) Applies, Trustees Are
Permitted to Settle Bona-fide Claims
CONCLUSION
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES1
Burdick v. Commissioner, 979 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1992)
*Commissioner v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 147 F.2d 977 (5th Cir.
1945). passim
Estate of Clayton v. Commissioner, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992),
rev'g and rem'g 97 T.C. 327 (1991)
Estate of Johnson v.
Estate of Strock v.
*First Nat'l Bank of
Flanagan v.
Northern Trust Co. v. United States, 78-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 13,229 (N.D.
111. 1977)
Oetting v.
UNITED STATES CODE:
26 U.S.C. § 664
26 U.S.C. § 2053
*26 U.S.C. § 2055(a)
*26 U.S.C. § 2055(c)
*26 U.S.C. § 2055(e)(2)
26 U.S.C. § 2055(e)(3)(F)
26 U.S.C. § 6212
26 U.S.C. § 7522
TREASURY REGULATIONS:
26 C.F.R. § 1.664-2(a)(4)
26 C.F.R.§ 20.2055-2(c)(1)(ii)
*26 C.F.R. § 20.2055-2(e)(1)(i)
REVENUE RULINGS:
Rev. Rul. 89-31., 1989-1 C.B. 277
MISCELLANEOUS:
S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423, 479
*Stephens, et. al., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION, (7th ed. 1997)
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
[4] The brief filed on behalf of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
("CIR Br.") largely avoids the primary point of this appeal. The
primary position urged by the Estate of Melvine B. Atkinson in its original
brief ("Est. Br.") is that the Tax Court opinion erred by failing to
address the application of 26 U.S.C. § 2055(a) (relating to the normal
charitable contribution for federal estate tax purposes where the charitable class
constitutes the sole qualifying testamentary beneficiary), the precedent of
this Circuit in Commissioner v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 147 F.2d
977 (5th Cir. 1945), ("C&S") (protecting the charitable deduction
against post-mortem departures by the fiduciary), the precedent of
virtually every United States Court of Appeals and United States District Court
to address similar situations, and the inter vivos statutory exclusion
of the split-interest subsection, Section 2055(e)(2).
[5] The Commissioner, like the Tax Court opinion, begins in medias res
by assuming that Section 2055(e)(2) -- not 2055(a) -- necessarily applies. He
defers discussion of the statutory exclusion of Section 2055(e)(2) to page 40
of his brief, he relegates citation to the authority of the other Courts of
Appeal to a footnote on page 53 of his 56 page brief, and he dismisses this
Circuit's protection of charities as outdated. Instead, the Commissioner relies
primarily, though not exclusively, on the handling of Mrs. Atkinson's life estate
-- an interest statutorily excluded for these federal estate tax purposes under
Section 2055(e)(2) as "extinguished upon the decedent's death." The
Estate addresses herein the most significant aspects of Commissioner's brief.
[6] This case must be reversed because the Tax Court opinion inadvertently
repeals that inter vivos statutory exclusion by omission and because the
opinion conflicts with all of the appellate authority protecting charities in
this testamentary situation -- appellate authority the Tax Court opinion also
omits.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
[7] Like the trial opinion, the Commissioner assumes away the conclusion and
thereby avoids mentioning the ultimate issue and its components. Both the trial
opinion and the Commissioner's statement of the issue skip over the question of
how Section 2055(a) -- not (e)(2) -- applies to the sole qualifying
beneficiaries (the charities), whether the explicit statutory exclusion
(omitted by the Tax Court) precludes application of subsection (e)(2) ("other
than an interest which is extinguished upon the decedent's death"),
whether the precedent (omitted by the Tax Court) of virtually every other Court
to address this situation concludes that post-mortem settlements (such
as the settlement of Mrs. Birchfield's claim) do not create split-interests for
purposes of 2055(e)(2), whether the precedent of this Circuit (also omitted by
the Tax Court) protects the charitable deduction in this case, and whether
Congress specifically provided a statutory mechanism in Section 2055(c) for
dealing with any additional tax without defeating the charitable deduction in
its entirety. Instead, the Commissioner repeats the errors of the past by
avoiding the real issues that cannot be reconciled with his conclusion or his
windfall at the expense of charities.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(i) Course of proceeding and
disposition in the Court below. The Estate disputes the implication that
the Tax Court ever addressed the "issue on appeal."
(ii) Statement of the facts. No error is assigned
to the factual findings by the Tax Court2 but two areas in the
Commissioner's description warrant comment:
a. The Commissioner seeks to prejudice the Estate and the charities by
maligning their fiduciary for his handling of Mrs. Atkinson's life estate
checks. As the Commissioner later acknowledges, the handling of the life estate
is statutorily excluded from Section 2055(e)(2). CIR Br. 41. For that reason,
no proper purpose is served by focusing on the belatedly raised criticism of
the fiduciary.
b. Without the benefit of a factual finding by the
Tax Court, the Commissioner now asserts that neither the Estate nor the
Irrevocable Charitable Trust treated the payments to Mrs. Birchfield as the
"settlement of a claim" until the Estate's current counsel was
engaged prior to trial. Compare that contention with the operative documents
filed in the Probate Court (even before the estate tax return was filed) that
the Commissioner cites. (Doc. 30, Stip. ¶ 11; R. Exs. 18-J - 21-J).
SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT
[8] The Commissioner, like the Tax Court, starts out on the wrong foot by
skipping over Section 2055(a), C&S, Bank of Fayetteville, Flanagan,
Oetting, Northern Trust, Strock, and the other authorities that control
where a post-mortem dispute is settled. By racing to the assumption that
Section 2055(e)(2) (with its limited invocation of Section 664) controls, the
Commissioner urges that the over $4 million dedicated solely to charity -- as
the sole qualifying testamentary beneficiary -- should be ignored in its
entirety. He does so despite his acknowledgment that 2055(e)(2) was designed
"to eliminate abuses . . . by ensuring a closer correlation between the
amount of charitable deductions and the amount ultimately donated to
charity." CIR Br. 21.
[9] The Commissioner seeks a windfall at the expense of the charities based
primarily on the inter vivos handling of Mrs. Atkinson's life estate.
Yet, careful analysis reveals what the Commissioner tacitly admits at pages
41-42 in his brief: the handling of Mrs. Atkinson's life estate is a red
herring for federal estate tax purposes under the explicit statutory
exclusion in the very statute upon which he relies. Section 2055(e)(2)
explicitly excludes Mrs. Atkinson's life estate as an:
. . . interest which is extinguished upon the decedent's death.
[10] The Commissioner effectively urges that he may abuse the important policy
of matching the charitable deduction with the property actually passing to
charity -- as well as the laudable tradition of liberally construing
legislation in favor of charity -- by coupling the red herring of Mrs.
Atkinson's life estate with a passing reference in the same legislative history
to "coordinating the tax treatment of CRATs with that of private
foundations" (in order to limit the ability of a trust to accumulate
income with no income tax). CIR Br. 21. In Mrs. Atkinson's situation, that
concern is unfounded, untimely, and statutorily irrelevant for federal estate
tax purposes.
[11] Five points clear the confusion created by the Commissioner:
1. Section 2055(a) -- Not (e)(2) -- and the Authority of this and Other
Circuits Control.
[12] Perhaps understandably, the Commissioner confuses the distinction Mrs.
Atkinson drew in the charitable remainder trust she formed shortly before her
death. It contains inter vivos provisions that created a life estate for
her. A host of income tax rules, regulations, and sanctions govern the handling
of those inter vivos provisions. The trust, however, also contains
testamentary provisions that speak to the handling of her trust assets upon her
death. Those testamentary provisions -- not the inter vivos provisions
-- control for federal estate tax purposes and determine whether 2055(a)
or (e)(2) applies. The flush language of Section 2055(a) and 26 C.F.R. §
20.2055- 2(e)(1)(i), Example 6 both exclude the contingent election rights the
contingent beneficiaries rejected prior to the filing of the estate tax return.
Hence, Section 2055(a) controls.
[13] As recognized in Bank of
2. By Ignoring These Authorities, the Tax Court Opinion and the Commissioner
Create Unnecessary Dangers for Every Trust Officer in Every Bank, Every Elderly
Citizen with Charitable Intentions, and Every Charitable Trust That Can Be
Targeted by Unscrupulous Claimants.
[14] Nothing on the face of the Tax Court opinion suggests that it considered
the practical consequences of disregarding these authorities. According to the
Tax Court and the Commissioner, a misplaced check, a failed mailing, or an
undeposited distribution destroys all recognition of the property dedicated to
charity. The payment of a penny to a non-charitable claimant exposes the charities
and those who serve them to grossly disproportionate consequences -- exposure
that will be exploited by the unscrupulous. That exposure contravenes the
policy of encouraging charity.
3. Mrs. Atkinson's Life Estate Was Properly Handled, But That Life Estate Is
Statutorily Irrelevant for Estate Tax Charitable Deduction Purposes.
[15] The previously noted cases address the relationship between Section
2055(a) and (e)(2), but this is a case of first impression insofar as the
Section 2055(e)(2) exclusion ("extinguished upon decedent's death")
is concerned. It must be reversed because the Tax Court inadvertently repealed
that statutory exclusion by omission.
[16] Secondly, the Commissioner finds it necessary to rely upon a recurring
straw argument that the Estate seeks a license for trusts to defy the law prior
to the decedent's death. Nothing could be further from the truth, for the inter
vivos activities are subject to severe inter vivos income tax
consequences, sanctions, and penalties for any infraction. Those alternative
remedies are precisely what prompted this Circuit to protect the charities
against any departures by their fiduciaries in C&S.
4. The Settlement of Mrs. Birchfield's Claims Does Not Defeat the
Recognition of the
[17] The Commissioner relies on his own regulations to urge a split-interest
after Mrs. Atkinson's death, but those regulations establish that (i) the right
to make an election (such as that held by Mrs. Birchfield and the other
contingent secondary beneficiaries) does not create a split-interest, 26 C.F.R.
§ 20.2055-2(e)(1)(i), Example 6; and (ii) their termination of that right well
before the date of the estate tax return (by refusing to meet the condition
precedent by the date ordered by the Probate Court) is effective as of the date
of Mrs. Atkinson's death under 26 C.F.R.§ 20.2055- 2(c)(l)(ii). This latter
regulation and the flush language of 2055(a) focus this testamentary inquiry on
the due date of the return, not the "founding" of the trust. CIR Br.
43. Finally, the settlement of Mrs. Birchfield's claims is, as the Probate
Court determined, supported by full consideration and is thereby excluded from
the application of (e)(2) which only reaches transfers "for less than
adequate and full consideration." For these reasons, (e)(2) does not reach
the settlement or the secondary beneficiaries' rejected rights.
5. The Charitable Trust is Not Liable For Taxes and, Even If It Were, the
Charitable Deduction is Protected by Congress in Section 2055(c).
[18] No taxes are due on the settlement of Mrs. Birchfield's claims because
claims are deductible under 26 U.S.C. § 2053. And even if additional taxes were
due under a proper valuation of that settlement, Section 2055(c) reduces the
charitable deduction by the taxes without disallowing the full deduction. Had
Congress intended to ignore the entire amount passing to charity as the
Commissioner urges, it could have easily said so. Instead, Congress chose to
encourage charity.
ARGUMENT
A. THE COMMISSIONER, LIKE THE
TAX COURT, STARTS OUT ON THE WRONG FOOT BY SKIPPING OVER SECTION 2055(a), CITIZENS,
OETTING, BANK OF
[19] The Commissioner follows the lead of the Tax Court and leaps over the
controlling Code Section and cases straight to assuming the conclusion that 26
U.S.C. § 2055(e)(2) applies in this case. Like the Tax Court, the Commissioner
essentially ignores the Estate's primary position and every appellate decision
on point in order to start with his self-serving strict construction of the
technical requirements for a charitable remainder annuity trust
("CRAT") under Section 664.
[20] Mrs. Atkinson formed the trust roughly 20 months prior to her death. It
was a split-interest trust (with split charitable and non-charitable interests)
for federal income tax purposes because she retained a life estate. Due to that
life estate, the trust and the life estate were subject to a host of income tax
rules, regulations, sanctions, and penalties for any infraction. At her death,
however, the federal estate tax is invoked. At that stage, no
split-interest existed and the charities constituted the sole qualifying
beneficiaries because all of the potential non- charitable beneficiaries
(including Mrs. Birchfield) elected not to comply with the condition precedent
for obtaining an interest and did so prior to the filing of the federal estate
tax return. See 2055(a) flush language; 26 C.F.R. § 20.2055-2(c)(1)(ii). As
such, no split-interest existed after Mrs. Atkinson's death and therefore
Section 2055(e)(2) does not apply.
1. The Commissioner Assumes that Section 2055(e)(2) -- Not 2055(a) --
Necessarily Applies Without Addressing Its Five Threshold Hurdles.
[21] The Commissioner's rush to apply Section 2055(e)(2) and his self-serving
strict construction of Section 664 is, however, no mistake. It is a tribute to
the hurdles he must overcome before applying (e)(2):
(i) Section 2055(a) precludes application of Sections 2055(e)(2) if no
split-interest exists at Mrs. Atkinson's death and the only testamentary
beneficiaries qualifying under the terms of the controlling document are
charities.
(ii) The Commissioner can only defend the Tax Court
opinion by assuming Section 2055(e)(2) applies, because the Tax Court
mistakenly repealed the statutory exclusion ("other than an interest
extinguished upon the decedent's death")3 by omission. The
language of (e)(2) precludes its application (and its limited invocation of
Section 664) if the noncharitable beneficiary's interest is "an interest
which is extinguished upon the decedent's death" as Mrs. Atkinson's life
estate was upon her death.4
(iii) Section 2055 and the Commissioner's own
regulations confirm that, since the contingent secondary, beneficiaries did not
elect to pay their share of the tax and receive an annuity interest, none of
them-including Mrs. Birchfield-received an interest that "passed from the
decedent" and created a split- interest for purposes of Section
2055(e)(2). 26 C.F.R. § 20.2055-2(e)(1)(i), Example 6. See also Section 2055(a)
and 26 C.F.R.§ 20.2055-2(c)(1)(ii) (termination of right/election prior to
filing of estate tax return is effective as of date of death).
(iv) The authority of every case to review similar
situations confirms that Section 2055(a) -- not (e)(2) -- Protects the
charitable deduction against post-mortem settlements. Oetting v.
(v) The Estate seeks to fulfill -- and the
Commissioner resists -- the Congressional purpose that proved pivotal in those
cases: "To provide a better means of assuring that the amount received by
the charity will accord with the charitable deduction allowed to the
donor."5 SREP.No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1969),
1969-3 C.B. 423, 479.
Here, the actual benefit to the charities exceeds $4,000,000, greatly exceeds
the charitable deduction taken, and dwarfs the charitable deduction urged by
the Commissioner of ZERO.
[22] As these hurdles indicate, the Commissioner must pretend that Section
2055(e)(2) applies. That is why he defers until page 40 of his brief any real
discussion of the statutory bar to Section 2055(e)(2). And even then, he buries
his response to why Section 2055(e)(2) does not apply inside his argument that
assumes it does. CIR Br. 40. The statute itself reveals at least three reasons
why the Commissioner's application of 20-55(e)(2) is wrong:
(2) Where an interest in property . . . passes or has passed from the decedent
to a person, or for a use, described in subsection (a) [i.e., to benefit
charities], and an interest (other than an interest which is extinguished
upon the decedent's death) in the same property passes or has passed (for
less than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.) from
the decedent to a person, or for a use, not described in subsection (a)
[i.e., a non-charitable person or entity], no deduction shall be allowed
under this section for the interest which passes or has passed to the person,
or for the use, described in subsection (a) unless
(A) in the case of a remainder interest, such
interest is in a trust which is a charitable remainder annuity trust or a
charitable remainder unitrust (described in section 664) . . . (Emphasis
added).
To fall within §2055(e)(2), the Commissioner must therefore cross three
thresholds:
(i) An interest in the same property must pass from the decedent to a person
for charitable purposes;
(ii) An interest in the same property must pass
from the decedent to a non-charitable person; and
(iii) The interest passing to the non-charitable
person must be other than an interest which is extinguished upon the decedent's
death.
[23] None of those thresholds were met on or after the date of Mrs. Atkinson's
death since no non-charitable testamentary beneficiary ever qualified. As a
result, the Irrevocable Charitable Trust contained a remainder when it was
formed with Mrs. Atkinson's life estate but, no other non-charitable
beneficiary interest existed, when that life estate and the other secondary
beneficiaries' contingent interests were extinguished upon the decedent's
death." The Trust was purely charitable for testamentary purposes and is
entitled to a normal charitable contribution deduction under Section 2055(a).
2. Mrs. Atkinson's Life Estate Is Irrelevant under Section 2055(e) (2).
Since Her Interest Was " Extinguished upon the Decedent's Death. "
[24] If property passes from the decedent at her death with interests split
between charitable and non-charitable beneficiaries, Section 2055(e)(2) allows
an estate tax charitable deduction for the remainder interest provided the
trust is established in accordance with pertinent provisions in Section 664.
However, a split-interest must exist after the decedent's death to invoke
Section 2055(e)(2).
[25] The Commissioner confuses why a split-interest does not exist for
estate tax purposes. CIR Br. 40-42. First, the Commissioner suggests that the
Estate took liberties in excluding a clause from the leading treatise as
non-essential, but the exact same principle is actually restated elsewhere in
the same treatise -- without the clause the Commissioner deems so important:
If a decedent made a lifetime transfer in trust and retained the right to the
income for life, the rules may preclude a gift tax deduction but do not
affect the estate tax deduction, because the offending private interest is
"extinguished upon the decedent's death." (Emphasis added).
Stephens, et. al., Federal Estate And Gift Taxation, ¶ 11.02[2]
(Emphasis added.). Accord:
Therefore, if the annuity trust simply had provided income to Atkinson for
life, remainder to charity at her death, then (1) there would be no
"offending private interest" at Atkinson's death, and (2) it would be
possible to determine the exact date-of-death value of the charitable
remainder. The deduction would be proper. CIR Br. 41-42, citing to Stephens,
et al., Federal E-state and Gift Taxation ¶ 5.05[8][b]. (Emphasis added).
[26] In short, the Commissioner admits that Mrs. Atkinson's life estate is
legally irrelevant. Therefore, the Commissioner's entire case depends upon his
establishing that a testamentary split- interest existed. He fails to do so.
[27] He finds it necessary to bottom his split-interest argument upon
focusing at page 43 on the "founding" of Mrs. Atkinson's Trust -- to
the exclusion of her date of death and, more importantly under Section 2055(a)
and his regulations, the filing date of her estate tax return. He relies almost
entirely upon the conditioned (and rejected) rights of the contingent
beneficiaries to elect to pay their share of any estate tax and he asserts that
the prospects of that election was not "negligible" at the
"founding of the trust." CIR Br. 42-43.
[28] These contentions are diametrically opposed to the language of the
statute and the very regulations upon which he relies. The regulations cited by
the Commissioner first look to the date of the decedent's death -- not the
"founding of the trust" -- to determine if an interest is
"negligible" and then addresses elections in Example 6. That example
proves that the right to make an election(there, a dower right) does not create
a split-interest and no interest "passes from the decedent" unless
the election is made. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2055-2(e)(1)(i), Example 6 ("If,
however, W does not elect to take her dower interest . . . interests in the
same property have not passed from H for charitable purposes and for private
purposes"). See also, 26 U.S.C. § 2055(e)(3)(F) (cited by Commissioner for
proposition "charitable deduction allowed if, before due date of estate
tax return, income beneficiary dies or trust terminates or distributes
according to its terms leaving only interest to be donated to charity";
CIR Br. 54). Here, Mrs. Birchfield rejected that election from inception and
the Probate Court forced the remaining contingent beneficiaries to an election
a month before the filing of the return. They unanimously rejected the
election. Under the flush language of Section 2055(a) and 26 C.F.R. §
20.2055-2(c)(1)(ii), the termination of that power/election "for any
reason shall be considered and deemed to be a qualified disclaimer"
eliminating the interest altogether. 26 U.S.C. § 2055(a). The statutory deadline
is "before the date for the filing of the return" -- not the
"founding of the trust" urged by the Commissioner. The interests of
the contingent beneficiaries are, therefore, not just negligible: they are
non-existent. Thus, no split-interest exists.
B. THE CONCLUSION URGED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND THE TAX COURT CREATES
UNNECESSARY DANGERS IN THE PRACTICAL HANDLING OF CHARITABLE BEQUESTS.
[29] Carefully consider the consequences of the Commissioner's belatedly raised
concern over taxing lifetime distributions under Section 2055(e)(2). If a trust
officer at Wachovia, SunTrust, or Farmers & Merchants Bank ever fails to
send a check to the life estate beneficiary, the charities will later be
cheated and the Commissioner reaps a windfall. If a secretary, clerk, or new
associate fails to send that check, the charities are cheated, and the
Commissioner reaps a windfall.
[30] Virtually every element of the Commissioner's brief is tied back to his
great concern over taxing lifetime distributions. The Commissioner focuses upon
the reference in the legislative history to the relationship between private
foundations and CRATs. He later explains that the problem is accumulating
income inside a CRAT with no income tax. CIR Br. 30, 39. He contends that the
passing reference to this concern in the legislative history overrides the
overwhelming focus of that same legislative history upon matching the
charitable deduction to the amount actually passing to charity. Bank of
[31] In the Commissioner's view, the passing reference to private
foundations also overrides the precedent of this Circuit in C&S, the
precedent of virtually every Court to address similar situations, and seventy
years of Supreme Court authority encouraging the most noble of human virtues,
charity.
[32] When did he first raise this great concern over this perceived inter
vivos "abuse" that lifetime distributions were escaping income
taxation? Surely he described that important basis for his contentions in his
statutory notice of deficiency as required by 26 U.S.C. §§ 6212 and 7522. No.
How about in his pleadings? No. Well then, surely he focused upon this
"abuse" in the trial memorandum filed on the eve of trial where he
suggested for the first time that lifetime distributions "may" be
relevant to the estate tax charitable deduction. Doc. 34, p. 5-6. Not one word
is mentioned about private foundation abuse or Mrs. Atkinson including the inter
vivos distributions on her income tax returns. Surely this great concern
was addressed in his opening statement and over the course of the trial. No,
counsel for the Commissioner waived opening statement and never once suggested
that the distributions were escaping income taxation. The Commissioner
criticizes the Estate for not asking the Tax Court to keep the record open with
respect to the perceived private foundation abuse and the income taxation of
the distributions (CIR Br. 48), but when was the first time the Commissioner
mentioned private foundation abuse, or income taxation of the lifetime
distributions? That would be in his opening brief three months after the
conclusion of the trial and almost two months after the closing of the record.
[33] At the time the Commissioner issued his statutory notice of deficiency,
filed his pleadings, lodged his trial memorandum, and waived his opening
statement, who held Mrs. Atkinson's original income tax returns that would
prove conclusively that no abuse exists because -- while she did not cash the
checks -- she included the income attributable to those distributions in her
taxable income? Why, that would be the Commissioner.
[34] That is why he never overtly asserts that Mrs. Atkinson failed to
report those amounts on her income tax returns -- because the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") knows she did. The Commissioner simply seeks a
windfall by implying what the IRS knows is not true and then arguing that a
great abuse exists when the IRS knows it does not. If the Court has any doubt,
please remand the case for a determination of whether Mrs. Atkinson reported
the distribution amounts on her income tax returns or, better yet, ask Counsel
for the Commissioner to state in his place that she did not.
[35] The post-mortem consequences of the Commissioner's contentions
are at least as destructive from a practical policy perspective as his inter
vivos allegations. Those contentions and the Tax Court conclusion now expose
every trustee of every charitable trust. This case hands every disgruntled
relative, heir, professed paramour, and plaintiff this sword:
I don't care what the controlling testamentary documents say and I don't care
that my claim has little or no merit. If I recover a penny, the estate loses
its entire federal charitable contribution deduction. So, pay me one-third of
the value of that deduction or face the fall-out from breaching your fiduciary
duty.
[36] Worse yet, the trustee is handcuffed. If he or she settles -- as the
trustee did here in response to threats against persons and property (arson and
assault), fiduciary liability, and bar complaints for the failure of the trust
to meet Mrs. Birchfield's demands -- the Commissioner says the Estate loses the
charitable deduction in its entirety. If he or she fails to settle and the
claimant recovers one penny from the charitable trust or bequest, the Tax Court
says the Commissioner reaps a windfall at the expense of the charities. That
offends the overriding policy long recognized by this and other courts favoring
settlements.
[37] The truth here is that the Commissioner is simply seeking a technical
"loophole" to justify his windfall, and that invokes the words of
Judge Wiener in the parallel circumstance of Estate of Clayton v. Commissioner,
976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'g and rem'g 97 T.C. 327 (1991)
where the Commissioner was seeking to ignore a marital deduction in its
entirety based on a strained reading of the marital split-interest
Qualified Terminable Interest Property ("QTIP") provisions:
"Loophole" is a term frequently used as a pejorative in the context
of taxation. Although it is usually reserved for taxpayers and their
professional advisors, in truth the Commissioner and the Service are no less
active in probing tax statutes for loopholes. . . . The position taken by the
IRS and advocated by the Commissioner in the instant case, however, goes beyond
mere probing for loopholes overlooked by Congress. Rather, it reflects an
effort to batter such a hole in the statutory wall where none exists. . . .
From every standpoint -- history, expressed intent, logic, reading in pari
materiae with other post-mortem provisions, and -- above all -- the plain
language of the statute -- the position of the Co- Executors meets muster while
the Commissioner's fails. Clayton, 976 F.2d at 1499.
[38] That, in turn, invokes Estate of Shelfer v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d
1045(11th Cir. 1996) where the Commissioner -- not the citizen -- successfully
argued that the powerful policy behind the marital deduction should override a
violation of the technical "all income" requirement under the Qualified
Terminable Interest Property ("QTIP") provisions, the marital
equivalent of the charitable split-interest provisions pressed by the
Commissioner here. Shelfer dealt with the estate of the surviving spouse
which maintained that the property should not be included in her estate because
she was not entitled to the income from the stub period between the last annual
distribution and her death.
[39] On the strength of the Commissioner's Congressional purpose argument,
this Circuit reached an errily parallel conclusion: the marital deduction
statute and its "all income" clause must be liberally construed to
fulfill the Congressional purpose despite the technical complications raised by
the failure to distribute the stub period income to the surviving spouse. If
that is the way liberal construction worked when the Commissioner's ox was
being gored by technicalities, that is the way it must work when the citizen's
ox is being gored.
C. THE SETTLEMENT WITH MRS. BIRCHFIELD CANNOT CREATE A
[40] The Trustee and other trust representatives faced a difficult and
unfortunate situation: a claimant threatening violence, arson, and a lawsuit
that would jeopardize the funds that Mrs. Atkinson devoted to charities. Mrs.
Birchfield's claims varied wildly. After extensive negotiations the Trustee
resolved the dispute by agreeing to pay the settlement in the form of an
annuity. The form made economic sense because, based on the harsh reality of
Mrs. Birchfield's terminal condition, few payments would be made. The Probate
Court and the charities blessed the settlement.
[41] What most would call effective trust administration, the Commissioner
sees as an opportunity to take a large chunk of the over $4 million that Mrs.
Atkinson dedicated to various charities such as the Mayo Clinic and children's
hospitals. Realizing that he must find an actual split-interest that survived
Mrs. Atkinson's death, the Commissioner asserts that the Trustee, never
considered the payments to Mrs. Birchfield as a settlement of her claims, until
current counsel was engaged. CIR Br. 13, 52, footnote 21.
[42] The Commissioner's positions regarding the settlement with Mrs.
Birchfield are flawed for at least four reasons:
(i) A post-mortem settlement cannot create a split- interest and invoke
2055(e)(2);
(ii) No split-interest was created under 2055(e)(2)
as the settlement was "adequate and full consideration" for release
of all claims;
(iii) The payment of the claims is fully deductible
under 26 U.S.C. § 2053, thereby creating no additional taxes to be paid from
the Charitable Trust; and
(iv) Even if Section 2055(e)(2) applies and
the claim is not deductible, Section 2055(c) allows the trustee to pay estate
taxes relating to the settlement, without jeopardizing the charitable
deduction.
1. Under the Authority of Every Court to
Consider the Issue, the Post-Mortem Settlement Cannot Create a Split-Interest
for Purposes of Section 2055(e)(2).
[43] Every case, as well as the Commissioner's rulings, that addresses this
issue holds that post-mortem settlements do not create split-interests
as the non-charitable party does not receive an interest in the same
property passing to charity. See Section 2055(e)(2) (an interest in
property passes from decedent to charity and an interest "in the same
property" must pass to a non-charity); Oetting, 712 F.2d at 363; Bank
of Fayetteville, 727 F.2d at 746; Flanagan, 810 F.2d at 935; Warren,
981 F.2d at 782; Northern Trust, 78-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 13, 229 (N.D. Ill.
1977); and Estate of Strock, 655 F.Supp. at 1339; Rev. Rul. 89-31. As a
practical matter, these cases and rulings hold that Section 2055(e)(2) should
be limited to the abuses that testamentary section was enacted to prevent --
not destroy its Congressional purpose of "matching" and the overall
Congressional purpose of encouraging charity. Bank of Fayetteville, 727 F.2d at
747-748 ("This case involves none of the abuses which § 2055(e) was
enacted to prevent"). Here, the Commissioner perverts the Congressional
purpose by ignoring the over $4 million of property passing to charity.
[44] The Commissioner never addresses the reality that, under the settlement
in Bank of Fayetteville, the non-charitable party was paid an annuity of
$600 per month. Yet, he repeatedly relies upon the fact that Mrs. Birchfield
was paid (in full satisfaction of all claims) with four checks over the
anticipated short period remaining after the settlement was consummated. The
Eighth Circuit in Bank of Fayetteville was absolutely right when it concluded
on those facts that these statutes must be liberally construed to both match
the deduction with the charitable contribution and encourage greater charity,
but the facts here are actually stronger. Following threats of arson, assault,
fiduciary liability, and bar complaints for defending the terms of the Trust,
the fiduciary entered into a settlement. That settlement was structured as an annuity
after it was known that Mrs. Birchfield's life expectancy was short. For these
purposes, no material difference exists between satisfying a claimant years
after the decedent's death with one check and satisfying that claimant in full
with four checks. As in Bank of Fayetteville, et al., the amount (and
value) paid in full satisfaction of Mrs. Birchfield's claims can be easily
valued.
[45] The Commissioner slights the importance of the Bank of Fayetteville
line of cases by citing them for the first time in a footnote on page 53 of his
56 page brief and then maintains that they do not apply for the simple reason
that Mrs. Atkinson established her charitable trust (with its testamentary
provisions) during life.6 CIR Br. 53. Despite claiming testamentary trust
cases are irrelevant, the Commissioner cites (but does not discuss beyond a
parenthetical description) two of his own, Estate of Johnson and Burdick.7
CIR Br. 54-55. Both support recognition of the charitable contribution here.
[46] In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit found that the decedent
established a trust for the benefit of his sisters, maintenance of family grave
sites and charity. No one knew what would go to whom. The Fifth Circuit found
that the will established a split-interest trust that did not comply with
Section 2055(e)(2) and disallowed the charitable deduction. The Fifth Circuit
distinguished its decision from Oetting and similar cases, however, and
in the process distinguished itself from Mrs. Atkinson's situation. Johnson,
941 F.2d at 1320 ("The true distinction between Oetting and this
case is that in Oetting the amount payable to the noncharitable
beneficiaries was limited, and could be firmly assessed and separated from the
charitable bequest"). So too, the amount payable to Mrs. Birchfield
". . . was limited, and could be firmly assessed and separated from the
charitable bequest" at the time the fiduciary departed from the
testamentary terms. Indeed, the ability to assess her short interest was
greater and the precise amount was known sooner than in Bank of Fayetteville.
[47] Burdick focuses upon the arm's length nature of the post-mortem
settlement with Mrs. Birchfield. The Ninth Circuit properly disallowed the
charitable deduction in Burdick because the Court found the estate terminated
the split-interest -- without a genuine dispute -- for the sole reason
of obtaining a charitable deduction. The Court distinguished its decision from
the Oetting and Bank of Fayetteville line of cases for the same
reasons as the Fifth Circuit did in Johnson ("[Those] cases involve
situations where the nondeductible split-interest bequests were terminated in
settlement of a will contest or to avoid a breach of an executor's fiduciary
duties. This case does not involve such situations"). Burdick, 979
F.2d at 1371, note 3. Here, the dispute was genuine, if not hostile.
2. The Trustee, the Trust's Counsel. and the Probate Court Agreed that
the Birchfield Settlement Payments Were Adequate and Full Consideration for
Release of her Claims.
[48] Mrs. Birchfield's interest also does not create a split- interest for
purposes of Section 2055(e)(2) as the payments were "adequate and full
consideration" for release of her claims. See Section 2055(e)(2)
(non-charitable interest must pass "for less than an adequate and full
consideration"). The Commissioner challenges this position by asserting
that the Trustee never considered the payments to Mrs. Birchfield a settlement
of her claims until current counsel was engaged. CIR Br. 13, 52 footnote 21. In
support of this allegation, the Commissioner claims that the Trustee and
Probate Court amended the Irrevocable Charitable Trust to provide Mrs.
Birchfield her interest. CIR Br. 50 footnote 18. According to the Commissioner,
the "facts speak for themselves" that the trust was amended.8
Compare the Commissioner's contention that no claim was settled with the
testimony from trial and the documents filed in the Probate Court that the
Commissioner cites:
(i) The Trustee filed a "Motion to Approve Trustee's Compromise of
Claim and Pay Tax Liability of Mary P. Birchfield" (Doc. 30, Stip. ¶
11; Jt. Ex. 18-J; CIR Br. 8-9);
(ii) Order from the Probate Court that states:
* "Mary Birchfield is willing to accept immediate payment of the $667,000
and other valuable consideration, the adequacy of which is acknowledge, in
full settlement of any and all claims she may have. . . ."
* "It is in the best interest of the
remainderman, i.e. the unnamed charities for the Trustee to make the
distribution to Mary Birchfield to avoid potentially protracted litigation."
Doc. 30, Stip. 14; R. Ex. 27-J; See also Doc. 37, p.
162-163. The Commissioner himself refers to the payments to Mrs. Birchfield as
the settlement of a claim. CIR Br. 8-9.
3. The Commissioner Does Not Challenge the Deductibility of the Claim
Under Section 2053.
[49] The Commissioner claims that the Birchfield settlement causes the Estate
to incur an additional estate tax liability that is "significantly higher
than it otherwise would have been." CIR Br. 12, footnote 6. According to
the Commissioner, the charitable deduction is disallowed if estate taxes are
paid from the Charitable Trust.9 The payments made to Mrs.
Birchfield settled her claims and as such are deductible under 26 U.S.C. §2053.10
Thus, no additional estate tax liability exists to be paid from the Charitable
Trust. The Commissioner essentially concedes this issue.
4. Even If Section 2055(e)(2) Applies, Trustees Are Permitted to Settle
Bona-fide Claims.
[50] After failing to find any factual or legal support for his position that
the settlement is not a deductible claim, the Commissioner assumes it is. CIR
Br. 53. The Commissioner claims that even if the settlement is a bona fide
deductible claim, however, the Charitable Trust still fails to qualify as a
CRAT "because [the Charitable Trust] made non-charitable payments [to Mrs.
Birchfield], other than annuity payments, in violation of I.R.C. §
664(d)(1)(B)." Id. To make such an astounding assertion, the
Commissioner had to ignore his own regulations and common sense regarding sound
trust administration.
[51] Consistent with Section 2055(e)(2), the regulations under Section 664
allow CRATs to make "non-charitable payments, other than annuity
payments" if the payments are in exchange "for full and adequate
consideration." 26 C.F.R. § 1.664-2(a)(4). Here, the payments to Mrs.
Birchfield were full and adequate consideration for the release of her claims
for the failure of the trust to meet her demands. The Commissioner never
challenges that consideration and essentially waives that issue.
[52] As a result, no taxes are due as a consequence of the satisfaction of
Mrs. Birchfield's claims. Even if they were, those taxes would only serve to
reduce the amount of the charitable deduction under Section 2055(c) -- not
ignore Mrs. Atkinson's dedication to charity in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
[53] The Tax Court opinion must be reversed as (i) repealing by omission the
statutory exclusion of inter vivos interests "extinguished upon the
decedent's death"; (ii) conflicting with the precedent of this and
virtually every United States Court of Appeals to address similar post-mortem
settlements; and (iii) creating practical and disproportionate dangers for
every trust officer, elderly citizen with charitable intentions, and charity.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID D. AUGHTRY
Georgia Bar No. 028010
CHARLES E. HODGES II
Georgia Bar No. 358773
CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE
[54] It is hereby certified that service of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF FOR
APPELLANT has been made by Federal Express addressed to:
Anthony T. Sheehan, Esq.
Jonathan S. Cohen, Esq.
U.S. Department of Justice
Tax Division
601 D Street, N.W.
Room 7909
Washington, D.C. 20004
This 6th day of May, 2002.
DAVID D. AUGHTRY
Georgia Bar No. 028010
FOOTNOTES
1The most significant authorities are designated by an asterisk.
2 While irrelevant, the Estate takes exception to the
Commissioner implying the Birchfields paid for Mrs. Atkinson's medication
because the Trustee did not send her the annuity checks. That is an absurd
allegation considering that the Birchfields obtained $950,000 from Mrs.
Atkinson. CIR Br. 7.
3 The Estate apologizes for referring to the same statutory
exclusion so often, but the Tax Court opinion misses it entirely and the
Commissioner acknowledges its application (on page 40) but still devotes
two-thirds of his brief to the handling of Mrs. Atkinson's statutorily excluded
life estate.
4 Mrs. Birchfield received a settlement of "all claims"
years later. Mrs. Birchfield or any of the other secondary beneficiaries could
have received a noncharitable interest only if they either qualified under the
terms of the trust, or the trust was amended pursuant to Florida law. Neither
occurred. Therefore, Mrs. Atkinson possessed the only true non-charitable
interest and that was extinguished at her death.
5 As stated by the leading estate tax treatise: "The
recognized disparity between the assumed (and allowed) value of the charitable
bequest and its actual value was the reason for sharp legislative changes to
Section 2055 in the Tax Reform Act of 1969." Stephens, et. al., Federal
Estate and Gift Taxation, ¶ 5.05 [8] (7th ed. 1997).
6Again, it is irrelevant that a split-interest occurred during
Mrs. Atkinson's lifetime-as a CRAT or otherwise, what matters for purposes of
Section 2055(e)(2) is that an actual split-interest between qualifying
charitable and non-charitable beneficiaries continued or evolved after her
death.
7Estate of Johnson v. United States, 941 F.2d 1318 (5th
Cir. 1991); Burdick v. Commissioner, 979 F.2d 13 69 (9th Cir. 1992).
8 Florida law permitted no amendment and no party asked for it.
See Est. Br. 43.
9 Again, assuming he finds a split-interest after Mrs. Atkinson's
death that invokes Sections 2055(e)(2).
10 The parties considered the payment of any additional estate
tax liability additional consideration for Mrs. Birchfield's release of all
claims. Doc. 30., Stip. 11; Jt. Ex. 20-J.
END OF FOOTNOTES
Code Section: Section 664 -- Charitable
Remainder Trusts; Section 2055 -- Estate Tax Charitable Deduction
Geographic Identifier:
Subject Area: Charitable giving
Estate, gift and inheritance taxes
Industry Group: Nonprofit sector
Cross Reference: Estate of Melvine B.
Atkinson, et al. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. No.
3; No. 20968-97 (
2000, p.643; for the full text, see Doc 2000-20159 (16 original
pages) or 2000 TNT 145-10 
.)
For text of the estate's opening appellate brief, see Doc 2002-3807
(79 original pages) or 2002 TNT 48-32 
.
Author: Aughtry, David D.; Hodges,
Charles E. II; Hatchett, Joseph W.
Institutional Author: Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Martin;
Akerman,